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Australian children’s helpline 
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Abstract  
 
This article begins with the premise that morality is an intrinsic, although often 
invisible, aspect of everyday social action.  Drawn from a corpus of fifty audio-recorded 
telephone calls to Kids Helpline, an Australian helpline for children and young people, we 
examine one call to show how the young caller and counsellor co-construct ‘morality-in-
action.’ Ethnomethodological understandings and, in particular, Sacks’ description of ‘Class 
2’ rules and infractions show how an adolescent caller and counsellor collaboratively 
assemble moral versions of the caller. In puzzling out possible motives, the caller and 
counsellor can be seen to be attending to the implications of different moral versions of the 
caller. This attribution of motives is moral work in action, with motives contingently 
assembled, displayed and evaluated, with such work understood as displays of moral 
reasoning. The counselling call makes visible the counsellor’s interactional work to support 
and empower the client.  Analysis such as this offers counsellors ways of understanding and 
making visible their interactional and moral work within helpline call interactions. 
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Introduction 
In adult-child interactions, children’s moral agency often goes unrecognised and unrespected 
by adults. Children and young people, by virtue of being assigned the category of 
‘developing’, are expected not to be able to engage in reasoning about complex moral issues. 
As Mayall (2002) points out, despite many interactional encounters between adults and 
children involving aspects of morality, adults routinely ignore children’s competence in this 
social arena. Morality is interactionally enacted as parents (and teachers) characteristically 
seek accounts, and make judgments for and over children without regard to their value 
systems (Sterponi, 2003, 2009). In this way, Goode (1994) portrays adults in a missionary-
like role where their task is to dominate and convert children and young people to their 
particular moral universe. Herein lies the paradox identified by Mackay (1974) and others. 
Adults, such as teachers and parents, assume a child’s competence in certain tasks while, at 
the same time, denying them their competence. As Baker and Freebody (1989) note, children 
‘must know how to do something they are not credited with being able to do in order to 
participate in the adult’s agenda for learning how to do it’ (p. 84). In other words, adults 
expect children not to display the culturally proper understandings of morality and so direct 
them in particular ways while, at the same time, they routinely expect that children can make 
sense of the adult-formulated rules and social orders.  
 
Counsellors are one category of adult who appear not to work within the normalised 
expectations of adult-child roles and interactions regarding matters of morality. While 
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counsellors are traditionally engaged in activities that involve the deliberation over moral 
issues, they perform quite distinct interactional tasks. First, they are concerned to display 
professional neutrality and to treat the reported troubles of their clients as everyday and 
natural occurrences (Danby, Butler, & Emmison, 2009). An inter-related second point is that 
they do not proceed to an assessment of a person’s moral accountability. As Bergmann 
explains, professionals such as social workers and counsellors are ‘officially constrained to 
“de-moralize” issues’ (Bergmann, 1998, p. 291). Third, the counsellor, like an interviewer, 
forms ‘an ideal audience’ (Labov, 1967/1997, p. 397) because it is their job to listen, with the 
locus of attention directly on the troubles-teller. This set of interactional practices is evident in 
calls made to Kids Helpline, the only Australian national help line that deals specifically and 
typically with a population of callers aged five to eighteen years.  
 
Kids Helpline is an Australian helpline operating 24 hours per day, specifically for 
children and young people that offers professional counselling through phone, web chat and 
email, responding to over500,000 contacts per year, indicating the significance of this 
resource for young people needing emotional support.  The helpline works from the principle 
that young people have resources for solving their own problems (Danby, Baker & Emmison, 
2005; Emmison, Butler & Danby, 2007). One way that counsellors draw on young people’s 
resources is to propose the use of script proposals that give specific examples of what clients 
could say to a third party (Emmison, Butler & Danby, 2011). The counsellors orient to the 
philosophy of “we care – we listen” rather than from a belief that “we can solve your 
problems”. Orienting to this philosophy, counsellors use specific practices to avoid advice 
giving in line with the institutional remit of providing support, and not advice (Butler, Potter, 
Danby, Emmison & Hepburn, 2010). Counsellor strategies include their use of questions to 
help clients problem solve without being directive, while empowering clients and promoting 
self-directedness. However, this practice can create difficult interactional moments for the 
counsellor, particularly when the young caller explicitly asks for advice. At these times, we 
see most clearly the Kids Helpline philosophy at work.  
Morality-in-action 
We begin with the premise that morality is an intrinsic aspect of everyday social action . In 
other words, the social activities constitutive of morality are implicated in and through 
everyday interactions so that morality and interaction are ‘deeply intertwined’ (Bergmann, 
1998, p. 279). A second feature of morality work is that it is typically unseen: ‘morality is 
such a common and intrinsic quality of everyday social interaction that it is usually invisible 
to us, like glasses that provide a sharp sight to the area although they themselves remain 
unseen’ (Bergmann, 1998, p. 280). Rarely is morality made explicit within social interaction, 
unless a social order is demonstrably being breached. It is at this moment that assessments or 
evaluations of courses of action as moral issues become visible.  
We turn to Sacks’ (1992) lectures on ‘accountable actions’ for further insights. Sacks 
points out that, from an adult perspective, children have ‘a rather poor notion of causation’ 
(Sacks, 1992, Vol. 1, p. 77) and that adults typically teach children about the consequences of 
their actions through formulating different types of rule:  
 
Call them Class 1 and Class 2. A prototype of Class 1 is, “Don’t stick your hand on the stove.” 
Prototypic of Class 2 is “Honor thy father and mother” – and such things as “If you want people to 
love you, you should love them, be thoughtful of them, etc.” belong in that class.  
 With respect to an adult’s conception of reality we would say that these two are different, in that 
for Class 1 the consequences, whatever they are, naturally flow from the act done. If you stick 
your hand in the fire, you get burned. Whereas for Class 2, that’s not so. For a lot of things that 
you do that are said to be wrong or harmful, somebody has to do something to you for you to get 
the negative consequence. You can ‘get away with’ things of the Class 2 sort. (Sacks, 1992, Vol. 
1, p. 78)  
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Sacks suggests that very young children appear not to know the difference between 
these classes of rule, a fact that adults frequently exploit. Adults do so by formulating Class 2 
type rules in terms of Class 1 type operations. In their dealings with children, adults describe 
the consequence of Class 2 rule violations as ‘natural facts of life’ that happen quite 
independently of anyone doing anything. For example, a child might be told to behave or be 
good ‘or Santa Claus won’t bring you anything’. One major resource for children in 
determining whether they are dealing with a Class 1 or Class 2 rule are ‘lies and secrets’. As 
Sacks explains, children ‘begin to discover that that there are some things which they can 
violate, that, if the adult doesn’t know, isn’t told, doesn’t find out about nothing happens’ 
(Sacks, 1992, Vol 1, p. 79). 
In this paper, we examine one telephone call to Kids Helpline to show how the young 
caller and counsellor co-construct ‘morality-in-action’ as a consequence of a particular Class 
2 rule infraction. The call is selected from a corpus of fifty calls already audio-recorded for 
quality assurance chosen randomly over a six-month period. The calls were transcribed using 
the conventions of conversation analysis (Psathas, 1995), with names and other identifying 
information changed to protect the anonymity of the caller and counsellor. The entire audio-
recorded call under investigation here is approximately twenty-six minutes long and so it is 
not possible to reproduce the call in its entirety. Consequently we draw on extracts from that 
call to explicate instances of the moral orders at work. 
Drawing on an entire helpline counselling call as an extended sequence is particularly 
relevant for this investigation, where a single call focus can show the progression and 
unfolding of particular moral orders proposed by the caller and considered by both caller and 
counsellor as possible solutions to the caller’s problem. The benefit of analysing one single 
extended call is that the call can be understood in its entirety. Known as a single case analysis 
(Hutchby & Wooffitt, 1998) or an extended sequence (Psathas, 1992), a single extended 
sequence can show how the call unfolds, how particular moral versions are proposed and 
evaluated, and how alternate versions are put up for scrutiny. In this way, overall attention is 
given to the complexity of the entire interactional sequence and structure (Psathas, 1992). As 
Schegloff (1988) points out, a single occurrence can ‘bring with it “internal” evidentiary 
resources that warrant its being taken very seriously indeed’ (p. 442). In contrast to drawing 
from a range of interactional events to exemplify a particular conversational phenomenon, the 
analysis of a single interaction can show ‘the locus of social order’ (Schegloff, 1988, p. 442) 
of an interactional event.  
In the call discussed here, Anna, aged 16 years, describes her recent trouble with school 
teachers to an male counsellor at Kids Helpline. The trouble had arisen because she had 
photocopied an old medical certificate and changed the date to cover her recent absence at 
school due to illness, despite having the proper and current medical certificate at home. The 
forgery had been subsequently discovered. In the call, Anna offers two accounts for why she 
presented the forged medical certificate to her teacher. At first, it appears that Anna is 
employing damage control (rebuilding her social category identity of a ‘good student’), but 
this is only partly what is at play here. By examining how she takes up, or does not take up, 
particular courses of action and ‘what she should be/do’, we see in detail the complexity of 
the moral orders proposed by Anna. What becomes evident is how moral concerns are made 
relevant, as implicated in and through the unfolding of this interaction (Bergmann, 1998). 
The descriptive categories oriented to by both Anna and the counsellor implicate 
particular versions of social identity. In everyday life, we routinely assemble and assess moral 
versions of each other, and these assessments are inferentially rich, both in relation to the 
person being described and the describer. Sacks’ work on membership categorisation analysis 
provides the foundational resource here. In his lecture ‘Hotrodders as a revolutionary 
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category’ (Sacks, 1992, Vol. 1, p. 396-403), Sacks demonstrates how the use of this category 
allows teenagers to draw cultural boundaries around their activities. Knowledge of how to 
correctly use the term hotrodder, and the inferences that could be drawn from this, was 
restricted to teenagers. In contrast, adults did not invoke this category as they lacked the 
appropriate members’ knowledge.  
In this telephone call, although categorization deployment also can be observed, the 
category-bound activities invoked by Anna and subsequently identified by the counsellor are 
all recognisable from an adult perspective. When Anna asks what she should say to the 
teachers tomorrow to account for her forgery, this becomes a morality puzzle that they seek to 
collaboratively resolve. Each of the two considered accounts implicates a particular type of 
social identity and the construction of a particular social reality. The counsellor’s task is 
essentially that of illustrating these two differing realities for Anna. In the first version she is 
constructed as a normal teenager experimenting with adult authority. The second version 
proposes a story about the malignant influence of “evil spirits” that have propelled her against 
her will. Both Anna and the counsellor eventually support the construction of the first reality, 
that of normal adolescent. In their deliberations, the counsellor invokes the moral force of a 
Class 2 rule by means of a proverb, rather than relying on any explicit statement about the 
evils of lying. 
 
The interplay of proposing accounts and possible resolutions 
Anna’s call to the counsellor becomes a rich interactional space for telling her story.  
Her story illustrates two essential features of narrative: It has a clear beginning, middle and 
end; and there is an ‘appeal to the element of mystery’ (Labov & Waletzky, 1967/1997, p. 
30).  
Stories told in any social interaction have two key purposes. The first purpose can be a simple 
retelling of an event, in other words, a description of what happened. Even so, this story 
implicates the teller (and also, the listener) as any telling involves the transformation of an 
event into a social occasion that is evaluated first by the teller, and then reported to an 
audience (Labov, 1997, p. 396). A second purpose for telling a story is to try and get out of 
‘the trouble’, whatever that might be. Stories generally are started because an external 
motivation has created a personal fascination (Labov & Waletzky, 1967/1997). In this way, 
stories are constructed so as to ‘place the narrator in the most favourable light’ (Labov & 
Waletzky, 1967/1997, p. 30), as the teller attempts to persuade the listener to judge the story 
in the same way that the teller does, in other words, to take the same moral position as the 
teller of the story on how the world works (Labov, 1997). As Labov (1997) says, the 
experience is ‘colored by the moral stance taken by the narrator’ (p. 400). It is most likely that 
the  narrator seeks a sympathetic and complimentary hearing.  
Anna’s call takes the form of an extended story (Labov & Waletzky, 1967/1997) 
comprising a preface (“I have some problems at school”), an orientation (“I was sick, went to 
the doctor, stayed home”), a complicating action (“I went back to school and photocopied my 
certificate from last time”), result (“I got caught”), evaluation (“I don’t know why it 
happened”) and resolution (“Bring the doctor’s certificate and letter from mother”). We look 
specifically at the interactional and moral work undertaken by Anna and the counsellor as 
they consider Anna’s query asked in her evaluation, “I don’t know why it happened”. 
Designed by Anna as a puzzle, both Anna and the counsellor assess the possible implications 
that emerge from each proposed action and, as with any story, it is only when we know why it 
happened, that the story then has an end (Silverman, 1998). 
We begin with the entry problem (Psathas, 1992) by showing the originating context 
and formation of the puzzle that is to direct the remainder of the call. The Kids Helpline 
counsellor’s (CT) initial turn (extract 1, line 1) contains only an organizational identification 
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(Danby & Emmison, 2005; Emmison et al., 2007). The design of this turn serves two 
important purposes: it avoids giving callers an implied obligation to give their names thereby 
proposing that their anonymity can be preserved – should the caller so desire; and second, 
unlike the majority of opening helpline turns, it does not presuppose that the caller is wanting 
or seeking help (cf. Danby & Emmison, 2005). This opening utterance thus places the onus on 
the caller to design her entry into the call in whatever way she feels appropriate. After her 
return greeting Anna (C) accounts for the call by saying that she wants to talk to someone 
about some problems she has at school (line 5-6). Unlike story recipients in everyday 
conversation, the counsellor does not align with an explicit request to Anna to reveal the 
nature of these problems. Instead his response, “sure” (line 8), orients him from the start as a 
neutral listener who is ready to listen and is not awed by, or unduly concerned about, Anna’s 
problems. Anna continues, “I kind of have this trouble (.) you see I don’t know why it 
happened”, which is a usual type of evaluation (Labov & Waletzky, 1967/1997, p. 33). 
 
Extract 1  
 1 CT: hi there Kid’s helpline 
 2  (0.8) 
 3 C: um hello .hh um 
 4  (0.2) 
 5 
6 
C: ah-uh like I wanted to talk to er to someone about like 
I have some problems at school 
 7  (0.4) 
 8 CT: Sure 
 9 
10 
C: yeah .hh um ha I kind of have this trouble (.) you see I 
don’t know why it happened? 
 
Anna’s elaboration of her trouble (lines 9-10) as something that she cannot explain – “I 
don’t know why it happened” – rather than something that she is personally responsible, as in 
“I don’t know why I did this”, can be heard as her orienting to and thereby avoiding or 
waiving potential claims of moral accountability. However, it also serves to introduce an 
element of mystery (Labov & Waletzky, 1967/1997, p. 30) by instructing the counsellor to 
monitor her story in a particular way (as a puzzle). This initial description also sets up the 
trajectory of the interaction as both caller and counsellor work to solve the puzzle.  
In Extract 2, Anna begins her explanation to the counsellor about her ‘trouble’ at school 
by providing the details ‘in respect to person, place, time and behavioural situation’ (Labov & 
Waletzky, 1967/1997, p. 27), preserving the time sequence: Anna was sick for a couple of 
days (line 1), she went the doctor and received some prescriptions (lines 7-8).  
 
Extract 2 
 1 C: I was sick fo:or a couple of days .hh 
 2 CT: Yeah 
 3 C: and yeah 
 4  (0.4) 
 5 C:  I sort of u:um 
 6  (1.0) 
 7 
8 
9 
C:  um um what would you ah like went to the doctor’s .h and 
like he he didn’t give us he gave us some prescriptions 
so I like stayed away from school for a couple of days 
 10 CT: Mm 
 11 
12 
C:  um and then like a:ah I had to go back to school like 
today 
 13  (0.4) 
 14 C:  um and like I was sort of like 
 15  (0.4) 
 16 
17 
18 
C:  I don’t know why but like I basically photocopied the 
medical certificate from my last time and like (.) 
yeah 
 6
 19  (0.4) 
 20 CT: Sorry 
 21  (0.2) 
 22 CT: can you run that by me again you 
 23
24 
C: ah I I made a photocopy of the medical certificate from 
um 
 25  (0.6) 
 26 C: ah from previous time I was sick 
 27 CT: Yeah 
 28 
29 
C: and like I I gave it to my teacher and told them like 
yeah 
 30 CT: you told them it was for 
 31  (0.4) 
 32 C: yeah [yeah 
 33 CT:      [this this time 
 34 C: and he caught me on it (0.2) doing that 
 
This reporting of the trouble then becomes the backdrop for the counsellor and Anna, as 
they investigate together the moral implications of two proposals for what has occurred and 
the two corresponding resolutions, each producing a differing possible moral version of Anna. 
In each proposal, Anna provides an account for why she photocopied a previous medical 
certificate, changed the date on it, and offered it to the teacher even though she had the 
original one at home but had forgotten to bring it with her to school. The resolution, then, is 
what Anna and the counsellor agree Anna should tell the teachers at school tomorrow about 
her actions. The proposal accounts for ‘why’ she did it, and the ‘resolution’ is the agreed 
course of action that Anna will take at school the next day 
 
Proposal 1: experimenting to fool the teachers  
Resolution 1: tell the truth 
 
Proposal 2: evil spirits made me do it 
Resolution 2: make up a story 
 
As we discuss later, nested within Proposal 1 and its accompanying resolution 
(Resolution 1) is the second proposal (Proposal 2) and its resolution (Resolution 2). So even 
while two proposals are established, both Anna and the counsellor are seen to be working 
towards the first alternative as a solution.  
 
Proposal 1: Experimenting to fool the teachers  
Anna could have brought the genuine doctor’s certificate to school the next day, and that may 
have been the end of the incident. However, Anna persists in unfolding her story as a mystery 
as she engages the counsellor to help her make sense of these inexplicable actions. However, 
at this point in the call, she does now assume more responsibility for the problem that has 
arisen. She asks, “I don’t know why I did it” (extract 3, lines 7-8), a reference to the action 
she has reported in lines 16-18 in extract 2, and which is a reformulation of her earlier 
comment, “I don’t know why it happened” (lines 9-10 in extract 1). This reformulation by 
Anna appears to accept more responsibility, as indicated by her pronoun use: “why it 
happened” now becomes “why I did it”. As the call unfolds, Anna’s puzzle can be heard as a 
question of identity: how can I repair myself? 
 
Extract 3 
 1 
2 
3 
C: and erh I went to the doctor and he said don- don’t 
worry like erh I can give you proof that you’ve been 
sick but like you see .hh like it’s not a problem 
 4 CT: yeah 
 5 C: that ah like I I can prove that I was sick 
 6 CT: yeah 
 7
 7 
8 
9 
C: because it was true .h but the thing is like I don’t 
know wh(hh)y I did it? .h I just like kind of .h was 
experimenting? like you know 
 10 CT: experimenting? 
 11 C: ye(h)s 
 12 CT: what to see if you could fool the teachers 
 13 C: yeah 
 14 CT: okay 
 
In line 11, the counsellor picks up Anna’s explanation that she was “experimenting” 
(line 10) to provide a motive – the forgery was done to see if she could “fool the teachers”. 
The ascription of this motive serves to constitute Anna as a typical student for whom 
“experimenting” with adult authority is – if not a regular activity – at least explicable as a 
category-bound activity of adolescence.  
In looking at the ways in which Anna and the counsellor ‘search’ for possible answers, 
we adopt an ethnomethodological orientation that places emphasis on the process of motive 
avowal and attribution (e.g., Coulter, 1989; Sharrock & Watson, 1984). As Sharrock and 
Watson (1984) argue, 
 
ethnomethodology does not accept or reject the things that actors have to say about motives; it 
neither adopts a consistent scepticism nor gives a blanket endorsement – it suspends judgement on 
their adequacy…. It can do this with equanimity in looking to see if motive attributions are 
endorsed or treated sceptically by members of society. Do they buy into or dismiss some 
motivational account, what methods do they use in formulating and contesting motive attributions. 
(p. 444) 
 
Anna’s questioning of her motive is a crucial part of the puzzle to be solved for the 
ascription of a motive (or motives) can designate Anna as a particular category of person. 
Central to this proposal is the cultural assumption of ‘age categorisations in action’ (Nikander, 
2002, p. 11). Although the discussion is dealing with matters of forgery or deception, the 
description of these events has not been ‘morally loaded’ (Bergmann, 1998, p. 287). On the 
other hand, if the motive were found to be one of deception and lies, the implication is that a 
different category of person is constructed. In this way, motive is closely aligned to any 
assessment of morality.  
 
Resolution 1: Tell the truth 
Motives need to be accounted for or explained. Anna considers what to tell the teachers, 
saying that she would “like to tell them the truth” (lines 7-8)  
 
Extract 4 
 1 
2 
CT: so you’re a bit unsure about what to tell the teacher 
tomorrow= 
 3 C: =yes like I need someone to advise I mean 
 4  (0.6) 
 5 
6 
CT: okay what what sort of things have you thought of 
yourself 
 7 
8 
9 
C: .hh um I don I don’t know ((laughy)) just like tell them 
the truth I suppose or just basically .h you know like 
um 
 10  (0.4) 
 11 
12 
13 
14 
C: like you can ever everybody’s trying like to fool the 
teachers in some way like and then it just like h. yes 
but like you know it’s very unpleasant when you get 
caught ha 
 15 CT: isn’t it ((laughy)) 
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In this extract, we hear Anna explicitly requesting advice: “I need someone to advise” 
(line 3). After a slight pause, the counsellor sidesteps this request to instead ask his own 
question, “what sort of things have you thought of yourself?” (lines 5-6). Here we see the 
counsellor orienting to the institutional philosophy of Kids Helpline, which is to avoid direct 
advice (Butler, Potter, Danby, Emmison & Hepburn, 2010. In sidestepping this request, he 
then offers the caller an opportunity to demonstrate their own resources for managing the 
problem at hand. Thus, the counsellor’s tactic of sidestepping becomes a management 
strategy to avoid making explicit moral assessments, and to avoid giving any explicit advice.  
Anna first responds by saying that she would like to “just like tell them the truth” and 
then continues with the suggestion that “everybody’s trying like to fool the teachers in some 
way”. In this way, everyone in adolescence has the task of fooling the teachers in much the 
same way that ‘everyone has to lie’ (Sacks, 1992). Sacks’ example of “How are you?” shows 
a ceremonial question that does not usually require a truthful answer, but rather the acceptable 
response of “well thanks” even when “feeling terrible” may be more apt (Silverman, 1998, p. 
7). Even when challenged on the lie, a practical response may be, “everyone does, don’t they” 
(Sacks, 1992). Anna uses this same argument (lines 11-14) that then treats her transgression 
as a natural social expectation in much the same way that people are expected to lie about 
their health. Thus, ‘fooling the teachers’ can be claimed as a category-bound activity that 
‘everyone’ does as an adolescent. In Extract 5, later in the call, the counsellor revisits this 
theme and upgrades his assessment of this moral position by drawing again on the stage of 
life category of adolescent.  
 
Extract 5 
 1 CT: is that normal for you or is this sort of 
 2  (0.2) 
 3 CT: because this is an unusual situation= 
 4 
5 
6 
7 
C:  =it’s really unusual for me ((laughy)) .hh and like I 
basically ha (.) it’s like why are you ((laughy)) .hh 
like (.) very immature like ((laughy)) for my age like 
to behave like in this manner .hh [and 
 8 CT:                                   [um 
 9  (0.4) 
 10 C: um 
 11 
12 
13 
CT: I don’t know in some quarters it’s probably considered 
pretty normal for a sixteen year old to behave in this 
manner 
 14  (0.2) 
 15 
16 
CT: I mean it’s fairly normal for a teenager to be pushing 
boundaries and 
 17  (0.2) 
 18 
19 
CT: and (.) and trying to check out what ((clears throat)) 
how much they can get away with  
 20  (0.4) 
 21 CT: I mean that’s a fairly normal activity for a teenager 
 
The counsellor repeatedly refers to Anna’s actions as a “normal” (lines 1, 12, 15, 21) 
teenage activity of “pushing boundaries” (lines 15-16) and “trying to check out how much 
they can get away with” (lines 18-19). The counsellor’s repeated references to the “normal” 
teenage activity works partly as a challenge to Anna’s version of this action as “immature 
like” for her age (line 6). In this way, he formulates Anna’s motive as one typical of a normal 
teenager involving her taking responsibility for her own actions.  
The second proposal introduced by Anna, however, locates the responsibility for the 
action elsewhere. In this account, Anna is not responsible at all, and so is released from any 
wrongdoing or responsibility. 
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Proposal 2: Evil spirits made me do it 
Between the introduction of her first proposal and its resolution, Anna offers a second 
explanation for her actions of forging a medical certificate at school. In this version, Anna 
distances herself from the category of a normal teenager who seeks to fool the teacher. She 
proposes that she is basically “a good student” (extract 6, line 7), well respected in the school 
community with “some kind of authority” (line 10). If this is the case, then, have “evil spirits” 
made her do something “wicked” (lines 13-14)?  
 
Extract 6 
 1 
2 
C: um .h I just I just like don’t want to want my teachers 
to think bad of me? 
 3 CT: yeah 
 4  (.) 
 5 
6 
7 
C: um because like I it’s no it happened before I just like 
.hh you know sometimes like errh like you like basically 
I’m a good student and like 
 8 CT: yeah 
 9 
10 
11 
C:  you know .hh ah everybody believes me and like you know 
.hh you know like I have some kind of authority and then 
like you know sometimes like you know some kind of 
 12  (0.6) 
 13 
14 
C: haha I don’t know evil spirit tells you you have to do 
something like wicked 
 15  (0.4) 
 16 CT: okay 
 17 C: that’s what I did haha 
 18 CT: do you think your teacher’s going to buy that one 
 19  (0.4) 
 20 C: ah I don’t know ha 
 21 CT: a wicked spirit 
 22  (0.4) 
 23 C: no I don’t think so 
 24 CT: mm it might be a bit of a stretch 
 25  (0.6) 
 26 C: yes but ha ha that’s the only explanation I can find 
 
In extract 6, we observe Anna persuasively building her self-description through the 
invocation of a 3-part list (Jefferson 1990): (i) I’m a good student; (ii) everybody believes me; 
(iii) I have some kind of authority. However, this self-description seems to present her with a 
logical puzzle. If she is the model student she purports to be, then how could she have acted in 
the way she has? That there appears to be no logical explanation for her behaviour is 
displayed by the perturbations and hesitancies in her utterance in lines 9-11 (“…and then like 
you know sometimes like you know some kind of…”). This displayed impossibility of a 
logical account nicely provides for her proposal that there must be an ‘unnatural’ explanation 
for her actions. The appeal to these dark forces, however, is delivered in a jocular way: “like 
you know some kind of (0.6) haha I don’t know evil spirit tells you you have to do something 
like wicked” (lines 11-14). Although the spirit has propelled her into taking these 
uncharacteristic actions, it is not a sinister or malevolent creature that she feels threatened by 
but something more ‘playful’. Framing the spirit in this way seems to suggest that its 
invocation is not meant to be taken all that seriously – something the counsellor clearly 
identifies.  
Although the motivational explanation that evil spirits made her do it does seem 
implausible, accounts of this type have been shown to be effective in certain legal contexts. 
An early study by Taylor (1972) of sex offenders’ explanations of their crimes found that 
magistrates were more likely to accept the explanation by offenders that they had no 
conscious behavioural control and they were less likely to accept explanations that offered a 
motivational account. Anna’s appeal to the determining influence of an “evil spirit” does not 
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carry any weight for the counsellor. He immediately asks “do you think your teacher’s going 
to buy that one?” (line 18). He then goes on to suggest that “it might be a bit of a stretch” (line 
24). Anna, however, persists in maintaining that it is “the only explanation I can find” (line 
26). 
 
Resolution 2: Make up a story  
The counsellor then asks Anna to identify a possible resolution arising from her proposal that 
“evil spirits” made her do it. In the previous extract (extract 6), we saw that he suggested that 
Anna’s account was unlikely to be accepted by the teachers. In so doing, he did not directly 
comment on the morality of the account per se but how others, such as the teachers, may 
respond to it. He has avoided, through careful wording, any charge of ‘moralizing’ 
(Bergmann, 1998). In the following extract (extract 7), the issue of the morality of her actions 
is again topicalised. 
 
Extract 7 
 1 CT: [what are the alternatives that you make up a story 
 2  (1.4) 
 3 C: ahhhhhhhm 
 4  (0.2) 
 5 CT: how well would that work do you think 
 6 C: haha yeah .h um 
 7  (0.2) 
 8 
9 
C: .h like I could try lying but like I’m not sure like 
ah ah how far I can sort of like I mean 
 10  (1.0) 
 11 CT: all right 
 12  (.) 
 13 
14 
CT: so (.) okay well if if you made up a story and you 
told the teacher a lie tomorrow 
 15  (0.2) 
 16 CT: where could that end up do you think 
 17  (2.4) 
 18 
19 
C: um I’m just like hoping that he won’t tell the other 
teachers about my .hh accident like 
 20  (0.2) 
 21 
22 
23 
24 
C: that erh .h I just want to to to like uh proper ah 
I’m just trying to find the way that .h um I can 
escape the punishment? .h like of like sort of .hh um 
being embarrassed in front of the teachers? ha 
 25 CT: yeah 
 26 C: ah 
 27 CT: that’s not going to be easy 
 28  (0.6) 
 29 C: yeah 
 
Anna’s response to the counsellor’s question, “how well would that work do you think” 
(line 5), is to laugh, seemingly recognizing that the suggestion to “make up a story” (line 1) 
would not work. The counsellor’s description to “make up a story” (line 5) is then 
reformulated by Anna as “lying” (line 8). It seems that once Anna has renamed the activity as 
‘lying’, a different morally imbued category now can be heard. This type of activity becomes 
open for discussion, which the counsellor does in lines 13-14 (“well if you made up a story 
and you told the teacher a lie tomorrow”). Thus, the counsellor’s use of the less morally 
deplorable activity ‘making up a story’ and Anna’s subsequent renaming this activity of 
‘lying’ can be heard as the counsellor orienting to the institutional work of avoiding any 
charge of moralizing. 
Anna argues that while she could “try lying” (line 8), she’s not sure about this. The 
counsellor persists, asking her where this particular resolution might “end up” (line 16). It is 
at this juncture that Anna reformulates the contrasting descriptors of good student and evil 
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action. The activity that Anna had previously described as “wicked” (extract 6, line 14), one 
that would disrupt her identity of the “good student”, becomes downgraded by Anna to be an 
“accident” (extract 7, line 19) from which she wishes to escape punishment and 
embarrassment (lines 23-24). Downgrading her action manages to keep intact the identity of 
the “good student” who has engaged in an infraction, and not in any makeover of identity. 
The implicit reference is that the act of lying is not an activity associated with a good student 
but making a mistake (an accident), however, is possible. 
While not a major issue in this chapter, this extract shows the counsellor’s handing of 
the resolution as a strategic way of empowering the caller, one of the foundational principles 
underpinning the philosophy of Kids Helpline. The counsellor does not provide explicit 
advice (such as, “you really shouldn’t lie tomorrow”). Rather, he seems to open up the action 
of lying as a logically possible solution, but then lets Anna arrive at her own conclusion (that 
it’s a weak option). Anna shows that, while she seems to take the point, she’s still possibly 
entertaining the idea to tell a lie. Lines 13-16 show the counsellor’s second attempt to solicit 
the ‘right’ conclusion from Anna, which does not happen here in this extract. The counsellor 
returns to this point in the next extract, extract 8. In this way, the counsellor works to guide 
and scaffold Anna’s orientation towards displaying a particular way of reasoning. In other 
words, the counsellor does not straightforwardly deliver advice, again in keeping with this 
particular organization’s procedures and philosophy.  
 
Choosing a resolution 
As the counsellor sums up the options for Anna, he outlines the two already discussed 
resolutions and directs her to decide the one she will use tomorrow when she returns to 
school. The counsellor’s questioning of the implications arising from Anna’s proposed 
courses of action serves to steer her into a particular ‘right’ direction. He pushes Anna to 
make a decision, pointing Anna towards a particular moral position, that of “the truth” (line 
12). In this way, he constructs an interactional space for a moral resolution to her 
complication. He does this by referring again to the stage-of-life category (Nikander, 2002) 
that he had used in the first resolution, that Anna’s actions were those of a teenager 
experimenting with the boundaries between right and wrong. 
 
Extract 8 
 1 CT: okay so I guess the question at this point seems to be 
 2  (0.2) 
 3 CT: is how far do you go with the phony story 
 4  (0.6) 
 5 C: yeah 
 6  (1.6) 
 7 
8 
CT: I ah (.) ‘cause it seems to me from what you’ve told me 
you’ve got two choices you can either 
 9  (0.2) 
 10 CT: go to school and tell them 
 11  (1.0) 
 12 CT: the truth as you as you understand it of why you did it 
 13  (0.8) 
 14 
15 
16 
CT: even though you don’t fully understand why you did it 
but you’ve given you’ve talked to me about it tonight 
you’ve obviously talked to Mum about it 
 17  (1.0) 
 18 
19 
CT: that you know you were experimenting you just wanted to 
see if you could get away with it 
 20  (0.4) 
 21 CT: I mean that is the truth isn’t it 
 22 C: yes it is but 
 23 CT: okay 
 24  (0.2) 
 12
 25 
26 
CT: I mean I guess to to some extent that’s a pretty normal 
sort of teenage [curiosity 
 27 C:                 [hahaa do you think so ha 
 
In extract 8, we see the counsellor encourage Anna to take responsibility for her action 
(lines 10-12). At the same time that the counsellor upgrades this expectation from Anna, he 
downgrades the seriousness of the actual event to become one of experimentation and 
curiosity (lines 18-19, 25-26).  
In the next extract (extract 9), as the counsellor draws the call to a close, he engages in 
two interactional tasks. First, he refers to a proverb. The proverb is understood here to direct 
Anna towards a preferred solution. Second, he appeals to the pragmatics of the situation, 
which is the difficulty of sustaining lies. In both actions, there is no reprimand as to the 
morality of telling lies.  
 
Extract 9 
 1 CT: I I I guess you know that there’s an old 
 2  (0.6) 
 3 
4 
CT: old saying that basically says ((laughy)) that you 
know when you start to tell lies 
 5  (0.4) 
 6 
7 
CT: and you tell more lies to cover it up you actually 
get yourself in deeper don’t you 
 8 C: ha yes I know 
 9 CT: yeah 
 10  (0.2) 
 11 
12 
CT: and the more lies you tell the more lies you have to 
tell to try and cover up 
 13  (1.4) 
 14 C: hmm 
 
The counsellor produces Anna’s description of the second possible resolution as 
participation in a lie. He names it as this, and then refers to a popular saying: “there’s an old 
saying that basically says that when you start to tell lies and you tell more lies to cover it up 
you actually get yourself in deeper” (lines 1-7). The use of this proverb is instructive. 
Drawing on Sacks’ lectures, Silverman points out that proverbs are ‘usually treated as 
unchallengeable and therefore as something any conversationalist will know’ (Silverman, 
1998, p. 8). The counsellor’s reference to this popular saying also can be seen as implicating a 
particular Class 2 rule of conduct: “don’t tell lies – you’ll end up having to tell more” (Sacks, 
1992). Many adults, including parents, invoke this rule through moral censure (Wootton, 
1986), but the counsellor does not do this here. He relies instead upon the proverb’s 
vernacular force to produce agreement from the hearer, for Anna, also, treats the proverb as 
unchallengeable, acknowledging, “yes I know” (line 8). 
 
Coda: “They call that a learning experience” 
Once Anna and the counsellor agree on the course of action for tomorrow, the counsellor 
precloses the call by ‘returning the verbal perspective to the present moment’ (Labov & 
Waletzky, 1967/1997, p. 35). Known as a coda (Labov & Waletzky, 1967/1997), this 
conversational devise works to relocate the story from the earlier context of the time and place 
to shift it back to the present moment (Johnson, 1999). In Extract 10, the counsellor asks: “do 
you know what they call that … a learning experience” (lines 1-4).  
 
Extract 10 
 1 CT: do you know what they call that 
 2  (0.2) 
 3 C: what 
 13
 4 CT: a learning experience 
 5 C: learning experience 
 6  (0.4) 
 7 CT: you did something yest- you did something 
 8  (0.4) 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
CT: that (.) on looking back on it now you’re wondering why 
you did it that way and it’s one of those learning 
experiences you you write in the write in your little 
book in your mind and you say hey that’s one thing I’m 
not gonna do again= 
 14 C: =hehe yeah 
 15  (0.4) 
 16 
17 
CT: and life’s full of learning experiences like that isn’t 
it 
 18  (0.4) 
 19 C: mm 
 20  (2.4) 
 21 
22 
C: .hh okay thanks for that it was like very ahh hh.(.)very 
helpful for me to talk to you someone like 
 
The counsellor’s interactional move back to the present moment provides further 
opportunity to accomplish moral work, again in an indirect fashion. In lines 16-17, the 
counsellor suggests that “life’s full of learning experiences like that isn’t it”. The suggestion 
that we can learn from such experiences implies that the counsellor is once again 
‘normalizing’ Anna’s actions as those of a teenager. Packaged as a developmental 
phenomenon, “learning experience” can be heard as the activity of a stage-of -life category 
(Nikander, 2002; Sacks, 1992), in this particular case, that of a teenager. Moreover, a person 
occupying this stage-of-life category is expected to have experiences that turn out to be 
opportunities for learning, and also be able to formulate these experiences as learning 
occasions. In this way the counsellor maintains the ‘institutional’ format with its key 
organizational feature that overt moral assessments are to be avoided (by the counsellors, that 
is). Indeed, the skill of the counsellor seems to be to provide a local conversational 
environment in which the callers, themselves, may do these types of assessments. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has shown how an adolescent caller and helpline counsellor collaboratively 
assemble moral versions of a particular ‘Class 2’ rule infraction. Anna’s forgery is an action 
to which different motives can be attributed. In puzzling out possible motives and ways to 
restore her reputation, Anna and the counsellor can be seen to be attending to the implications 
of the moral versions of the particular type of student depicted.  
Each proposal and its resulting resolution, and the decision whether or not to pursue this 
possibility, implicates a particular moral frame. The first proposal positioned Anna as a 
teenager attempting to fool the teachers and push the boundaries of permissible behaviour. In 
this version, Anna is held responsible for these actions but this is mediated and justified by 
the fact that this is a normal adolescent activity. The key resource used here by the counsellor 
is the stage of life category (Atkinson, 1980; Nikander, 2002; Sacks, 1992) with its 
commonsensically understood teenage category-bound activities.  
The second proposal, where Anna invokes “evil spirits” as causal agents in her act of 
forgery, released Anna from all responsibility and blame. At the same time, it seems a rather 
improbable account – at least to the counsellor. In this way, while the first proposed a 
justification for the behaviour, the second is an excuse. This has implications for how the 
event becomes understood. As Taylor (1972) points out, ‘excuses merely neutralize an act 
when it is called into question, justifications assert its positive value in the face of a claim to 
the contrary’ (p. 28). A justification based on being a normal teenager makes a stronger and 
more plausible case for Anna, one that may be likely to be viewed positively by the teachers. 
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Within the context of this call, two points can be made about morality-in-action. First, 
evident in this call is the moral order of the interaction, as distinct from the moral order within 
the action (Bergmann, 1998). An extended sequence has allowed us to observe how the entire 
call was organised, to see how the proposals and resolutions were collaboratively explored, 
and to arrive at a preferred and agreed-upon version. Both caller and counsellor assembled 
moral order in ways that constructed particular identities, with each identity having associated 
rights and responsibilities (Jayyusi, 1984). The young caller oriented as a storyteller with a 
puzzle – albeit of her own making – to solve, and the counsellor oriented to this as a willing 
listener. Throughout, Anna implicated the counsellor as an advice-giver, although the 
counsellor avoids, or sidesteps, this to propose instead a different sort of activity that involves 
caring and listening, both attributes related to the philosophical underpinnings of the helpline. 
At the same time, the counsellor’s work seems to involve guiding callers towards preferred 
ends through the provision of a context for callers to arrive at certain conclusions. The 
counsellor, aligned to the institutional form of moral work that avoids giving explicitly moral 
advice, does not make direct moral assessments or provide direct moral advice. Rather, he 
makes it locally ‘natural’/‘reasonable’ for callers to arrive at their judgment. In this way, the 
counsellor operates out of a set of responsibilities that included listening, but not advice-
giving. For example, he made reference to the Class 2 rule concerning the unacceptability of 
lying through the use of proverbs. The rule was treated as a resource not to engage in ‘moral 
censure’ (Wootton, 1986, p. 160) but packaged as a device designed to elicit agreement from 
Anna. 
A second point about morality-in-action is that both the caller and the counsellor 
attended to the issue of ‘moral adequacy’ (Baruch, 1981, p. 276). There was attention directed 
at describing and re-describing Anna as a moral person and competent member of her 
category of ‘teenager’. At the same time, the counsellor was heard as orienting to being a 
competent member of the counselling profession through his work in directing Anna to her 
own resources for a resolution without explicit morality work, and still keeping true to the 
Kids Helpline philosophy of caring and listening, and not providing advice. If Anna had lied 
to the teachers and not been caught out, nothing might have happened at that time as she had 
‘got away with it’. As Sacks (1992) points out, though, this can sometimes lead to people 
waiting their entire lives for the Class I consequences of, or punishment for, their actions. In 
Anna’s account, her problem began when she was caught out and Anna shows how deeply 
troubled she is by being caught out by the teachers when breaking the Class 2 rule concerning 
lying.  
The attribution of motives is moral work in action, with motives contingently 
assembled, displayed and evaluated. Such work can be understood as displays of moral 
reasoning. Analysis such as this offers counsellors ways of understanding and making visible 
their interactional and moral work within helpline call interactions. 
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